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NOTE
Indirect Initiative and Unpopular
Referendum in Missouri
Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).
Gunnar Johanson*

I. INTRODUCTION
Most governments in the United States operate as a representative
democracy through elected officials. Over time, advocates have successfully
reformed many of our institutions to give citizens themselves more power
through direct democracy. The direct election of United States Senators, the
presidential primary, recall, the direct initiative, and popular referendum are
all developments in the governments of the United States that place power
directly in the hands of voters. Direct initiatives and popular referendums,
specifically, are lingering evidence of the Progressive Era of the 1900s.1 Like
most reforms of that time, proponents of direct initiative and popular
referendum believed it would aid in breaking up concentrated political power
in corporations and their enablers in the state legislatures.2 Almost half the
states instituted direct initiative and popular referendum before 1920.3
Direct initiative and popular referendum generally describe tools of
direct democracy that vary from state to state; there is no national initiative or
referendum process.4 The direct initiative process enables citizens to propose
a new or amended law, independently of the state legislature, often by popular
* B.A., Political Science, University of Missouri–Columbia, 2016; J.D.
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Member, Missouri
Law Review, 2020–2021; Associate Editor-in-Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2021–
2022. I would like to thank Professor Thomas Bennett, Jackson Gilkey, and Maddie
McMillian for their guidance during the writing of this Note.
1. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
INSTITUTE, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/ [https://perma.cc/UH6A-SCM3].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Dennis Polhill, The Issue of a National Initiative Process, INITIATIVES V.
OLIGARCHY, https://cusdi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Polhill-The-Issue-of-aNational-Initiative-Process.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL5L-HEMA] (this article can be
accessed directly from the Citizens for United Stated Direct Initiatives (CUSDI)
website under the provided pdf references).
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vote in a statewide election.5 Popular referendum, by contrast, “allow[s]
voters to approve or repeal an act of the legislature.”6 Initiatives can be
statutory or constitutional.7 Direct initiative proponents frequently prefer
constitutional amendments as most states do not allow the legislature to
unilaterally alter the constitution, whereas most legislatures can change
statutes as they wish, thus providing additional protection to their proposal.8
Many states also allow legislatively referred – or indirect – initiatives where
the state legislature is permitted to place a proposal on the ballot for voter
approval.9
Missouri voters encountered initiative and referendum in the voting
booth on November 3, 2020, when deciding on Amendment 3.10 Amendment
3 was the result of a legislature growing increasingly weary with Missouri’s
direct initiative process and weaponizing citizens’ tools for democracy.11 The
proposed constitutional amendment was an indirect initiative, referred to
voters by the legislature. However, this Note argues that the description of
Amendment 3 as an “unpopular referendum” is more fitting. Where a popular
referendum describes a citizen-led effort to repeal the will of the legislature,
“unpopular referendum” should describe a legislature’s effort to repeal the
will of the people. Amendment 3 aimed to repeal a direct initiative, known as
“Clean Missouri,” approved by voters less than two years earlier.12 The 2020
measure survived considerable legal challenge. The resulting case highlights
the flaws in Missouri’s initiative and referendum processes and the weak
judicial protections afforded to the procedures.
In this Note, Part II introduces the case of Pippens v. Ashcroft which
exemplifies the political tug-of-war occurring with the Missouri initiative
process. Part III explores how the Missouri legislature’s will often conflicts
with voters’ wants and how elected officials’ mal-intent is becoming
increasingly apparent. Part IV examines several measures from other states
5. See Nicholas R. Theodore, We the People: A Needed Reform of State Initiative
and Referendum Procedures, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 1401 (2013).
6. Id. at 1410.
7. Id. at 1408.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1409.
10. 2020 Ballot Measures, MO. SECRETARY OF STATE (last visited March 6,
2021),
https://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/petitions/2020BallotMeasures
[https://perma.cc/Q9VD-G4D4].
11. The Missouri General Assembly is ignoring the will of the voters by placing
Amendment 3 on the 2020 general election ballot, COMMON CAUSE (last accessed
March 6, 2021), https://www.commoncause.org/our-work/gerrymandering-andrepresentation/gerrymandering-redistricting/clean-missouri-initiative/
[https://perma.cc/X8DX-K84R].
12. Id.
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that, if adopted, would protect the initiative process in Missouri from such
mal-intent and abuse. Finally, Part V analyzes the government’s role in the
judicial review and drafting of ballot language which could ease the conflict
in Pippens and strengthen Missouri’s initiative process.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
To sufficiently understand the facts of Pippens, an examination of
“Clean Missouri” is required. On November 6, 2018, Missouri voters
approved Constitutional Amendment No. 1.13 Supporters of this proposal
nicknamed it “Clean Missouri.”14 This amendment was proposed by the
direct initiative petition process, where Missouri citizens independently
propose legislation for the ballot through the collection of signatures.15
“Clean Missouri” made multiple revisions to Article III of the Missouri
Constitution which established the legislative branch, or the General
Assembly, of the Missouri state government.16 The amendment focused
primarily on ethics reform and on the process of drawing legislative districts,
known as apportionment.17
“Clean Missouri” provided for substantial modifications to the
apportionment process for state House and Senate districts.18 It established a
new state position known as the “nonpartisan state demographer” who was
charged with preparing proposed legislative redistricting plans and maps
following the decennial census.19 The nonpartisan state demographer was
also given criteria to govern the designing of said districts.20 The
demographer had to give the districts a “total population as nearly equal as
practicable to the ideal population for such districts.”21 Specifically, “Clean
Missouri” required that districts be designed in a manner that achieves both
partisan fairness and competitiveness.22 The demographer also had to
consider geographic contiguity, the boundaries of existing political
subdivisions, and the compactness of the proposed districts.23 However, these
13. Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689, 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).
14. Jo Mannies, New limits to campaign finance confuse Missouri’s political
candidates,
ST.
LOUIS
PUBLIC
RADIO
(October
24,
2017),
https://news.stlpublicradio.org/government-politics-issues/2017-10-24/new-limitsto-campaign-financing-confuse-missouris-political-candidates
[https://perma.cc/QQ86-Z943].
15. Pippens, 606 S.W.3d at 694.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Ritter v. Ashcroft, 561 S.W.3d 74, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018).
19. Id. at 80–81; see MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 3(a)–(c), 7(a) (2020).
20. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 80–81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c).
21. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c)(1)(a), (b).
22. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c).
23. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c).
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considerations are subordinated to consideration of equal populations,
compliance with federal law, and partisan fairness and competitiveness.24
“Clean Missouri” largely retained the procedure, enacted before its
passage, where the Governor selected House and Senate reapportionment
commissions.25 As provided by the revisions, the commissions could then
make modifications to the demographer’s proposed plan and map by a vote of
at least seven-tenths of the commissioners.26 If no modifications were made,
the plan and map would become final.27 These citizen-proposed changes were
widely accepted by Missouri voters and passed with sixty-two percent of the
vote in November 2018.28
In 2020, the General Assembly set out to undo “Clean Missouri.” In its
regular session that year, the General Assembly passed Senate Joint
Resolution No. 38 (“SJR 38”) which submitted to voters a legislatively
referred constitutional amendment which modified the features of 2018’s
“Clean Missouri” ballot initiative.29 Its provisions were complex and
comprehensive, affecting Missouri’s ethics laws and its redistricting
processes. The General Assembly passed SJR 38 on May 13, 2020, largely
along party lines.30 It appeared on the November 3, 2020, General Election
Ballot as Amendment 3.31
The General Assembly has the prerogative to draft the official summary
statement for legislatively referred constitutional amendments, like
Amendment 3.32 The summary statement is the language that appears on
ballots. The legislature’s summary statement proposed to ask voters:
Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to:
■ Ban all lobbyist gifts to legislators and their employees;
■ Reduce legislative campaign contribution limits; and

24. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c)(1)(c), (d), (e).
25. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c)(2).
26. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 3(c)(3), 7(c).
27. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 3(c)(3), 7(c).
28. Official Results, General Election, November 6, 2018, MISSOURI SECRETARY
OF
STATE,
https://enrarchives.sos.mo.gov/enrnet/?eid=750004333
[https://perma.cc/A8QD-NH5W].
29. Pippens v. Ashcroft, , 606 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2020).
30. S. JOURNAL, 100TH GEN. ASSEMB., 2d Sess. at 241–42 (Mo. 2020); H.R.
JOURNAL, 100TH GEN. ASSEMB., 2d Sess. at 1772–73 (Mo. 2020).
31. Pippens, 606 S.W.3d at 693.
32. Id. at 698.
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■ Create citizen-led independent bipartisan commissions to draw
state legislative districts based on one person, one vote, minority voter
protection, compactness, competitiveness, fairness, and other
criteria?33

The resolution was challenged in the courts by proponents of “Clean
Missouri” almost immediately.34 On May 18, 2020, eight Missouri citizens
(“Challengers”) filed suit against the Missouri Secretary of State and the
leaders of the General Assembly as permitted by Missouri statute.35 The
challengers argued that each of the three bullet points in the official ballot
language drafted by the General Assembly for Amendment 3 were insufficient
and unfair as they did not clearly communicate to voters that Amendment 3
would largely repeal and replace “Clean Missouri.”36 The petition prayed for
the circuit court to vacate the existing summary statement and either order the
General Assembly to prepare a new one, or certify a replacement statement
that they proposed.37 On August 17, 2020, the circuit court entered its final
judgment, agreeing with the challengers that all three bullet points in the
General Assembly’s proposed summary statement were insufficient and
unfair.38 The circuit court vacated the General Assembly’s statement and
certified an alternative summary statement which the court drafted itself:39
Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to:
■ Repeal rules for drawing state legislative districts approved by
voters in November 2018 and replace them with rules proposed by the
legislature;
■ Lower the campaign contribution limit for senate candidates by
$100; and
■ Lower legislative gift limit from $5 to $0, with exemptions for some
lobbyists?40

The defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on August 18, 2020, and oral
argument was presented on August 28, 2020, in the Missouri Court of Appeals

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.; Missouri law allows any citizen of Missouri to challenge the official
ballot language for a legislatively referred constitutional initiative for being
insufficient or unfair. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190 (West).
36. Pippens, 606 S.W.3d at 698.
37. Id. at 699.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 700.
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for the Western District.41 The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the
circuit court’s judgment.42

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Missouri has a long and storied history with direct initiative and popular
referendum. Both processes were added to the state’s constitution at the
height of the Progressive Era in 1907 and have provided for some of
Missouri’s most prominent policies.43 For example, in 1936, Missouri
citizens voted to create a Conservation Commission – which now oversees the
Missouri Department of Conservation – to manage fish, game, and forest
resources.44 In 1940, a constitutional amendment was passed through an
initiative petition that established a nonpartisan system for nominating,
appointing, and retaining judges.45 This is now known as the “Missouri Plan”
for judicial selection and has served as the model for several states.46 In recent
decades, initiatives and referenda have resulted in meaningful policy
initiatives that affect the daily lives of Missouri citizens. Over one hundred
ballot initiatives have been proposed by Missouri citizens.47 Increases to the
minimum wage, union protections, healthcare expansion, and even medical
marijuana have all been approved – or disapproved – by Missouri voters
through a statewide popular vote.48 In contrast, popular referendum has been
used only about twenty-five times since its creation and in only two of those
instances was it successful.49
In the last two decades, and in almost every general election since,
Missouri citizens have passed many large-scale policy proposals via citizenled, direct initiative. The policy proposals that have been approved via direct
initiative include, but are not limited to:
■ Stem cell research (2006)

41. Id.
42. Id. at 713.
43. Robin Carnahan, Protecting Missouri’s Initiative Petition Process for
Citizens, MO MUNICIPAL REV. 10 (2012) (on file with author).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Charles B. Blackmar, Missouri's Nonpartisan Court Plan from 1942 to
2005, 72 MO. L. REV. 199 (2007).
47. David C. Valentine, Constitutional Amendments, Statutory Revision and
Referenda Submitted to the Voters by the General Assembly or by Initiative Petition,
1910–2008, Report 25–2008, MO. LEGIS. ACAD. (2008).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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■ Increased the minimum wage (2006)
■ Increased revenue for schools (2008)
■ Created a “Renewable Energy Standard” for utility companies
(2008)
■ Prohibited taxing the transfer of real estate (2010)
■ Regulated dog breeders (2010)
■ Restructured STL police force (2012)
■ Increased funding for education (2012)
■ Reformed campaign finance (2016)
■ Reformed redistricting (“Clean Missouri”) (2018)
■ Sanctioned medical marijuana (2018)
■ Increased the minimum wage (2018)
■ Expanded Medicaid (2020)50

The numerous successful initiatives and their varied topic areas demonstrate
a citizenry dissatisfied with the legislative priorities of its elected officials.
Instead of waiting for the General Assembly to pass meaningful legislation,
citizens and advocates mobilized, fundraised, and organized to take advantage
of Missouri’s tools of democracy. “Clean Missouri’s” large margin of
approval is just one of the many examples of citizens taking the state’s
legislative power into their own hands, only to find they apparently went too
far.
Two years after their passage, the major provisions of “Clean Missouri”
were narrowly repealed and replaced by Amendment 3.51 Mirroring the
initiative process, the Missouri Constitution gives the General Assembly the
right to legislatively propose constitutional amendments which shall be
approved or rejected by a majority of the voters of the state.52 Unlike the
citizen’s direct initiative process, the General Assembly is also authorized to
draft the official ballot language and summary statement to be printed on
50.
Id.(
(data
from
this
report
can
be
found
at
http://www.mofirst.org/issues/inr/MO-Petition-History.php [https://perma.cc/5XPXB72M]).
51. 2020 Ballot Measures, MO. SECRETARY OF STATE (last visited March 6,
2021),
https://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/petitions/2020BallotMeasures
[https://perma.cc/45SV-D87X].
52. MO. CONST. art. XII, § 2(b).
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ballots which “shall be a true and impartial statement of the purposes of the
proposed measure in language neither intentionally argumentative nor likely
to create prejudice either for or against the proposed measure.”53
Any citizen can challenge the official ballot title proposed by the
General Assembly for being insufficient or unfair.54 This judicial safeguard
is designed to give voters the ability to judge the desirability of a proposed
amendment.55 Furthermore, the challenge process is necessary to provide
voters a full realization of the proposals by the General Assembly.56 Judicial
review of ballot language, in particular, is especially important when
challenging legislatively-referred proposals who draft their own statements.57
In contrast, the language of citizen-proposed initiative petitions is drafted by
the secretary of state and reviewed by the attorney general.58
The burden to show the insufficiency or unfairness of the ballot language
falls upon the challenging party.59 “Insufficiency” is defined as “inadequate;
especially lacking adequate power, capacity, or competence.”60 “Unfairness”
is defined as language that is “marked by injustice, partiality, or deception.”61
Additionally, the summary statement should accurately reflect both the legal
and probable effects of the proposal.62 It should also inform voters of the
central features of the proposal.63 The applicable question is not whether the
language drafted is the best summary, but whether the language gives the
voter a sufficient idea of what the proposed amendment would accomplish
and whether it advises the voter what it is about.64

53. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.155 (West).
54. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190 (West).
55. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 193 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
56. Id. at 193 (citing Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 11–12 (Mo. 1981)
(en banc).
57. Id. at 193–94.
58. Id. at 203 n.4.
59. Hill v. Ashcroft, 526 S.W.3d 299, 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Shoemyer v. Sec'y of State, 464 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Mo. 2015) (citing Brown
v. Carnahan, 370 S.W.3d 637, 654 (Mo. 2012)).
63. Stickler v. Ashcroft, 539 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (internal
citations omitted).
64. Sedey v. Ashcroft, 594 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020), reh'g denied
(Feb. 4, 2020).
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District affirmed in part
and reversed in part the circuit court’s decision that the entire original ballot
language was insufficient and unfair.65 The Court of Appeals found that the
first point of the original statement – “Ban all lobbyist gifts to legislators and
their employees…” – was insufficient and unfair.66 The Court of Appeals
found that the second point of the original statement – “Reduce legislative
campaign contribution limits…” – was not insufficient and unfair and that the
circuit court erred in its revision.67 The Court of Appeals found multiple
problems in the third and final point of the original statement – “Create
citizen-led independent bipartisan commissions to draw state legislative
districts based on one person, one vote, minority voter protection,
compactness, competitiveness, fairness, and other criteria…” – and rewrote it
entirely.68
The third point attracted the most criticism from the court. As it was
written, the original statement made no explicit reference to Amendment 3’s
elimination of the position of Nonpartisan State Demographer, a primary
feature of the redistricting process adopted by voters in 2018.69 Thus, the
court held it as generally insufficient and unfair.70 Next, the third point
claimed that the commissions proposed are “citizen-led” and “independent.”71
The Court held such a description failed to accurately describe the
membership and operation of the commissions, which are largely made up of
partisan appointees.72 Finally, the Court held that the third point falsely
implied that SJR 38 established the listed criteria for drawing districts and
fails to acknowledge “in any fashion” that the proposal would greatly modify
and reorder the existing criteria.73 The increased priority of “partisan fairness”
and “competitiveness” was a primary feature of the redistricting process
adopted by voters in 2018; this point failed to inform voters that it would move
them to the very lowest priority.74
The court also held that the fact that SJR 38 largely modifies “Clean
Missouri,” which voters very recently approved, needed to be apparent.75 In
compliance with each of these issues, the Court of Appeals certified an
alternative summary statement, replacing the circuit court’s statement and
65. Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).
66. Id. at 698.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 699.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 700.
72. Id. at 709.
73. Id. at 710 (emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 711.
75. Id. at 712.
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amending the first and third points of the General Assembly’s original
statement:
Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to:
■ Ban gifts from paid lobbyists to legislators and their employees;
■ Reduce legislative campaign contribution limits; and
■ Change the redistricting process voters approved in 2018 by: (i)
transferring responsibility for drawing state legislative districts from
the Nonpartisan State Demographer to Governor-appointed
bipartisan; (ii) modifying and reordering the redistricting criteria?76

No appeal was made to the Supreme Court of Missouri by either party.
As a result, the Court of Appeals’ alternate language was certified for the
ballot in the general election. On November 3, 2020, Missouri voters passed
Amendment 3 with fifty-one percent voting “Yes” and forty-nine percent
voting “No.”77

V. COMMENT
On its face, Pippens v. Ashcroft is simply a case of what type of ballot
language is “insufficient and unfair.”78 However, the analysis of the court,
and the arguments of the parties, raise deeper questions worth examining.
First, what happens when the will of the legislature conflicts with the policy
goals of its constituents? Second, how can various constitutional changes
safeguard against the efforts of legislatures to overturn the goals of their
constituents? Finally, how can the state provide better – maybe nonpartisan
– drafting assistance and judicial review to proponents of initiatives and
referendums? This Part addresses each of those questions in turn.

A. Legislative Antagonism
An examination of recent legislative efforts reveal an antagonistic
disposition towards the initiative and referendum process of Missouri. Some
would claim Missouri has one of the few idyllic “citizen-legislatures” in the

76. Id. at 713.0
77. Gregory J. Holman, By a narrow margin, Amendment 3 reversed ‘Clean
Missouri.’ How did we get here?, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Nov. 5, 2020,
https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/04/missouri-electionresults-amendment-3-fails-ends-clean-missouri/6159978002/.
78. Pippens, 606 S.W.3d at 693 ; MO. REV. STAT. § 116.190.
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nation, where career politicians “are replaced by average members of the
community who enter and exit politics within a short period of time.”79 This
characterization is facilitated by Missouri’s term limits for its state
legislators.80 After serving eight years in each chamber, incumbents are
forbidden to seek reelection.81 Proponents of such term limits often argue that
they “enhance participatory democracy.”82 This Subpart argues that
Missouri’s term limits have done just that, leading to a surge of successful
initiative petitions being passed by actual citizens in the absence of legislative
efforts to address issues facing Missourians since the state’s term limits have
taken effect.
The alleged “citizen-legislature” has now taken the drastic step to
undermine the direct legislative efforts of the citizens. This is not a rare
occurrence. One might say it is becoming a pattern. Since term limits were
instituted, the legislature has attacked such efforts at least three other times.83
In 2008, the legislature created exceptions for renewable energy standards
expected to be passed by voters months later by initiative.84 Next, in 2011,
the same body repealed regulations for dog breeders passed by voters months
earlier.85 Finally, after voters defeated “Right to Work” in 2018, there was a
concerted effort to proceed with the policy anyway.86 A reflection upon these
efforts aids in understanding the legislature’s intentions today and will shed
light on recent comments and proposals by the governing party to axe the
citizen-led initiative petition process.
In 2008, the legislature sought to undermine the effectiveness of a direct
initiative before its anticipated passage. Proposition C was certified for the

79. Richard G. Niemi & Kristin K. Rulison, The Effects of Term Limits on State
Legislatures and Their Applicability to the Executive Branch, 4 ALB. GOV'T L. REV.
641, 648–49 (2011).
80. Id. at 660.
81. MO. CONST. art. III, § 8.
82. Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 623, 631 (1996).
83. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 84–86.
84. Earth Island Institute v. Union Electric Company, 456 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Mo.
2015).
85. S.B. 113 & 95, 96TH GEN. ASS., 1st Regular Sess. (Mo. 2011).
86. Jack Suntrup, Missouri voters said no to ‘right to work,’ Republican
lawmaker wants it anyway, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/missouri-voters-said-no-toright-to-work-republican-lawmaker-wants-it-anyway/article_365c4f4a-3303-5cdea44e-b6324bf2ab59.html [https://perma.cc/H224-5QQC]. “Right to Work” laws
guarantee that no person can be compelled, as a condition of employment, to join or
not to join, nor to pay dues to a labor union. Right to Work Frequently-Asked
Questions, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION,
https://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-frequently-asked-questions/
[https://perma.cc/L4GG-N2KP] (last visited March 7, 2021).
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November ballot by the Secretary of State in February of 2008.87 The
proposition was initiated by a citizen-led petition and it sought to enact a
requirement that utility companies use an increasing amount of renewable
energy in their electricity sales.88 In May of that same year, months before
voters would vote on Proposition C in November, the General Assembly
preemptively passed Senate Bill No. 1181.89 This bill created an exemption
from renewable energy requirements, now or in the future, for power
companies if they met alternative standards, conflicting with the ones
proposed by Proposition C.90 The Supreme Court of Missouri later held that
the efforts of the legislature “serve[d] as an end run around the constitutionally
protected right of the people of Missouri to enact legislation by ballot
initiative” and that the bill was repealed by Proposition C by implication when
it passed with sixty-six percent of the vote.91 The resulting case, Earth Island
Institute, is valuable in understanding the legislature’s antagonistic
predisposition to the initiative petition process.
In 2011, then-state Senator Mike Parson did not agree with Proposition
B, a proposal through the initiative petition process that imposed tough
regulations on dog breeders.92 He led a legislative effort to repeal the measure
barely a month after fifty-two percent of voters approved it.93 “Telling our
breeders how many dogs they can own and how to raise them is just the tip of
the iceberg,” said then-Senator Parson when he introduced legislation
eliminating many provisions included in Proposition B.94 The bill was passed
in March 2011 and signed by the Governor, Democrat Jay Nixon, in April
2011.95 Proposition B had just passed less than six-months earlier in
87. It’s important to note that citizens can propose both propositions or
constitutional amendments via the initiative petition process. Propositions, if passed,
become statutes that can change at the will of the elected legislature. Amendments are
set in the Constitution which can only be changed by statewide approval. Earth Island
Inst., 456 S.W.3d at 30.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 31.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 34..
92. Virginia Young, Voters’ puppy mill law closer to repeal, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Mar. 11, 2011, https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-andpolitics/voters-puppy-mill-law-closer-to-repeal/article_8a404eaf-754c-5213-a8f255ac7260a466.html [https://perma.cc/MM96-JEE2].
93. Id.
94. Pamela M. Prah, Missouri’s puppy mill politics: Dog breeders outmaneuver
animal-rights movement, THE SEATTLE TIMES, (May 25, 2011)),
https://www.seattletimes.com/life/lifestyle/missouris-puppy-mill-politics-dogbreeders-outmaneuver-animal-rights-movement/ [https://perma.cc/6R5A-BW2G].
95. S.B. 113 & 95, 96TH GEN. ASS., 1st Regular Sess. (Mo. 2011).
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November of 2010.96 The move caught the criticism of advocates. “Some
lawmakers are not only thumbing their noses at a statewide vote of the people,
but are also voting against their own districts,” said Wayne Pacelle, thenpresident and CEO of The Humane Society of the United States.97
As of May 2019, Missouri had the largest number of puppy mills in the
nation for the seventh year in a row, according to a report by the Humane
Society of the United States.98 “That’s what our country was based on – us
having a say so in our government . . . [i]f we vote for legislation and they are
able to change it because they don’t like the way we voted, then I think that is
wrong,” said Lauri Casey of Springfield, Missouri in response to repeal of
most of Proposition C.99
It seems to be increasingly common that the legislature does not approve
of the policies its own citizens enact. In December 2018, four months after
citizens voted down an attempt – via referendum – by the General Assembly
to make Missouri a “Right to Work” state, a Springfield-area state senator
filed legislation to enshrine it in statute anyway.100 “Democracy is not
freedom. Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to eat for
lunch,” Senator Burlison said to the KC Star.101 He further added that “in a
Constitutional Republic there are certain rights which should never be taken
away, not even by a 64% vote.”102
More recently, legislators have exhibited explicit distaste at the passage
of Medicaid Expansion by voters – via direct initiative – in August 2020.103
In May, three months before the issue would be voted on, the budget chair of
the Missouri House of Representatives, Representative Cody Smith, pushed a
measure that would ensure all Medicaid expenditures be specifically approved

96. Missouri Ballot Issue History, MISSOURI FIRST (last visited Mar. 8, 2021),
http://www.mofirst.org/issues/inr/MO-Petition-History.php
97. Kenn Bell, Missouri State Senate Overturns Puppy Mill Law Favored By
Voters,
THE
DOG
FILES,
Mar.
10,
2011,
https://www.thedogfiles.com/2011/03/10/missouri-state-senate-overturns-puppymill-law-favored-by-voters/ [https://perma.cc/BV8L-PYPP].
98. The Horrible Hundred 2019, THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES
(May 2019), https://www.humanesociety.org/sites/default/files/docs/2019_HorribleHundred_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZG7-FM6C].
99. Bell, supra note 97.
100. Suntrup, supra note 86.
101. Hunter Woodall, After Rejection By Missouri Voters, Republican
Resurfaces Right-to-Work Legislation, THE KANSAS CITY STAR (De. 4, 2018 6:29
PM),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/thebuzz/article222626700.html.
102. Id. If still in effect, “Right to Work” legislation would have prevented
employers and their employees the freedom to associate in a comprehensive union
relationship.
103.
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by the legislature.104 While it ultimately failed in the chamber, in a committee
debate, Smith said that the measure could “theoretically allow legislators to
choose not to fund Medicaid.”105 Still, even after its popular approval, some
state senators signaled that the vote could essentially be ignored.106 Senator
Bob Onder doubted the legislature would even fund the expansion in 2021,
citing budget concerns and an appellate court’s decision supposedly granting
the power to do so.107 Senator Eric Burlison also questioned the actual
implementation of Medicaid Expansion.108 “There are going to be a lot of
attorneys looking at this to see what flexibility we have … [a]nd from my
understanding, you can’t take away the legislature’s authority to appropriate,
so if the budget chairs in the House and Senate decide not to fund that line
item, then at the end of the day it doesn’t happen.”109 This comment was made
on Thursday, August 6th, 2020.110 Two days earlier, 1,263,776 Missouri
voters exercised their constitutional right by passing Medicaid Expansion by
a vote of 53.25% to 46.75%.111 The legislature did not implement Medicaid
Expansion until it was ordered to do so by Missouri courts almost a year later
in the Summer of 2021.112
Moving further than criticism or distaste, a number of Missouri officials
are now questioning the entire initiative petition process. In interviews
regarding the repeal of “Clean Missouri,” Governor Mike Parson has signaled
104. Austin Huguelet, Missouri voters could expand Medicaid, then let
lawmakers block it on the same ballot, SPRINGFIELD NEWS LEADER (May 11, 2020
6:54
PM),
https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/2020/05/11/could-gopresolution-block-medicaid-expansion-missouri/3108394001/
[https://perma.cc/JXH2-9WLH]; House Joint Resolution No. 106, 2nd Regular
Session,
100th
General
Assembly,
https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills201/hlrbillspdf/5152H.02C.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YHB4-USUL].
105. Huguelet, supra note 104.
106. Jack Suntrup, Missouri voters approved Medicaid expansion, but roll-out
talks just getting started, ST. LOUIS POST-Dispatch (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/missouri-voters-approvedmedicaid-expansion-but-roll-out-talks-just-getting-started/article_606ef32b-6c7752e1-8724-0a7b3b06d1fb.html [https://perma.cc/V6GH-HXL7].
107. Id.
108. Huguelet, supra note 104.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Alex Smith, Missouri Voters Approve Medicaid Expansion Despite
Resistance From Republican Leaders, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Aug. 5, 2020 11:01
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/08/05/898899246/missourivoters-approve-medicaid-expansion-despite-resistance-from-republican-le
[https://perma.cc/PL5V-L4ZA].
112

Doyle v. Tidball, SC99185 (Mo. Jul. 22, 2021).
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that he believes “it may also be time to raise the bar for initiative petitions to
appear on the ballot.”113 A few months later, four state senators proposed a
number of different measures that would raise the standards for efforts to
legislate through the initiative petition process.114 At a hearing for the
proposals, one witness stated that the standard would be so high that they
would effectively eliminate the initiative petition process altogether.115 All
measures failed in 2019.116 One was refiled in 2020 and it failed as well.117
All of these statements and actions show a general antagonistic
disposition by the legislature toward the initiative process that threatens
Missourian’s right to initiative and referendum, the primary way in which
citizens can respond to legislative neglect.

B. Constitutional Safeguards
There are possible solutions to protect the initiative process from a
legislative supermajority. Some states ban similar initiatives and referenda
from the ballot for a specific period of time.118 These policies aim to reduce
the number of measures on the ballot and ensure advocates and opponents do
not abuse the initiative process. In Massachusetts, for example, a proposed
initiative cannot be substantially similar as one that has appeared on the ballot
in either of the two preceding elections, which is essentially a six-year ban.119
Such a restriction would be welcome in Missouri to protect the citizen-led
initiative process.
In addition, various states place limits on the legislature’s power to
amend and repeal citizen-initiated statutes.120 This restriction exists with the

113. David A. Lieb, Missouri governor wants repeal of new redistricting law,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Dec.
23,
2018),
https://apnews.com/7702bd1c62244505a0653a99167480e3 [https://perma.cc/YQA3KPAT].
114. S.B. 5 & 256, SJRs 1, 7, & 11, 100th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., 2019.
115. Alisha Shurr, Senators propose upping initiative petition requirements,
THE MISSOURI TIMES, (Feb. 13, 2019), https://themissouritimes.com/senatorspropose-upping-initiative-petition-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/8AWZ-RND2].
116. SBs 5 & 256, SJRs 1, 7, & 11, 100th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., 2019.
117. SJR 31, 100th Gen. Ass., 2nd Reg. Sess., 2020.
118. At least five states have prohibited the same or a substantially similar
measure from reappearing on the ballot for a specified period of time after it is rejected
by voters: Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Wyoming. See Initiative
and Referendum in the 21st Century, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, (July
2002), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/task-force-report.aspx
[https://perma.cc/72YE-BHSL].
119. MASS. CONST., art. LXXIV, Sec. 1.
120. A legislature's power to amend and/or repeal a statute passed by the
initiative has beenrestricted in at least 10 states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming.
See Initiative and Referendum in the 21st Century, supra note 117.
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hope that it would incentivize statutory initiatives over constitutional ones,
which tend to be more pliable. Often, and especially in Missouri, petitioners
choose to amend the constitution so the legislature cannot change it on a
whim.121 For example, in Arizona, the legislature cannot repeal a statutory
initiative.122 To amend it, the body must pass a proposed change with a threefourths vote and the amendment must “further the purpose” of the measure.123
There are other restrictions worth examining that would limit the
legislature’s power to submit to constitutional amendments to voters. In
Missouri, a simple majority is required in the legislature to submit to voters a
constitutional amendment.124 Twenty-six states require legislatively referred
constitutional amendments to be approved by a supermajority before they go
to the ballot.125 Nine require a sixty percent supermajority vote in one session
of the state’s legislature.126 Seventeen others required a two-thirds – 66.67
percent – supermajority vote in one session of the state’s legislature.127 For
example, in South Carolina, a legislatively referred constitutional amendment
can be submitted to voters if it is approved by two-thirds vote of each chamber
of the state legislature.128 South Carolina further limits the legislature’s power
by requiring a second affirmative vote if voters approve the amendment.129
Finally, eleven states require the legislature to pass constitutional
amendment proposals twice in consecutive sessions in order to refer them to

121. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM
IN
THE
21ST
CENTURY
10
(2002),
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/irtaskfc/IandR_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NKN-E29S]; see also Initiative and Referendum in the 21st
Century, supra note 117..
122. ARIZ. CONST., art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, paras. 6, 15.
123. Id.
124. MO. CONST., art. XII, § 2(b).
125. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 120;
Initiative and Referendum in the 21st Century, supra note 117.
126. ALA. CONST. art XVIII, § 284; FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ILL. CONST. art.
XIV, § 3; Kent. Const. § 256; MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. XIV, § 1;
N.H. CONST. art. 100, pt. II; N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 4; OHIO CONST. art. XVI § 1.
127. ALASKA CONST., art. XIII, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1; COLO. CONST.
art. XIX § 2; GA. CONST. art. X, § 1, para. II; IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 1; KAN. CONST.
art. 14, § 1; LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. X, § 4; MICH. CONST. art. XII,
§ 1; MISS. CONST. art. XV, § 273; MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 8; S.C. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 1; TEX. CONST. art. 17, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. XXIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. XXIII,
§ 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; WYO. CONST. art. 20, § 1.
128. S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
129. SId.
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the ballot.130 Some require two votes in some circumstances and one vote in
others, depending on, among other factors, how decisive the first vote was.131
For example, the Tennessee General Assembly must approve a proposed
amendment in two successive sessions before it is submitted to voters.132 The
first approval only needs a majority approval.133 The second session, the
proposal must earn a two-thirds supermajority before being placed on the
ballot.134 Four states use a system that is a hybrid model between
supermajority approval and the consecutive session requirement.135 For
example, in Connecticut, the state legislature must approve a proposed
amendment by a supermajority vote of seventy-five percent.136 But, if the
legislature approves the measure by a simple majority in consecutive sessions,
such approval is sufficient for submission to voters.137
Any of the restrictions discussed above would have prevented the
underlying conflict in Pippens.138 By either protecting citizen-led initiatives
or restricting legislatively referred ones, the will of voters could be guarded
from antagonization by elected officials. However, absent these constitutional
reforms, states like Missouri depend on judicial protections to avoid abuse of
the initiative and referendum processes. As Pippens demonstrated, Missouri’s
existing judicial protections are not enough.

C. Judicial Safeguards
Modern judicial review of state constitutional amendments is largely
deferential, imposing limits only on the procedure of their implementation and
not their substance.139 Relevant procedural review includes the courts’ ability
to review ballot language of a proposed amendment via initiative or
referendum.140 In Missouri, such review is allowed by statute and is designed
130. IND. CONST. art. 16 § 1; IOWA CONST. art. X, § 1; MASS. CONST. art.
XLVIII, pt. IV; NEV. CONST. art. 16, §1; N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1; PA. CONST. art.
XI, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3; VT. CONST. § 72; VA.
CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
131. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 120;
Initiative and Referendum in the 21st Century, supra note 117.
132. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. CONN. CONST. art. XII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. XVII, § 3; N.J. CONST. art
IX; PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
136. CONN. CONST. art XII, § 1.
137. Id.
138. Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689, 698–700 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).
139. Jonathan L. Marshfield, Forgotten Limits on the Power to Amend State
Constitutions, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 68 (2019).
140. See id. at 68–70 n. 10; see also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, supra note 120; Initiative and Referendum in the 21st Century, supra
note 117.
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to protect against insufficient and unfair language.141 In an ideal world, the
resulting language is fair and sufficient after a challenge in court. However,
in practice, and as demonstrated by Pippens, judicial review of ballot language
does little to ensure voters receive a fair and sufficient description of a
measure if the measure is fundamentally designed to deceive.142
Section 116.190 of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides Missouri
courts – specifically the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri – the power
to edit insufficient and unfair ballot language.143 This power to correct
deficient language is reflected in a great majority of states.144 Such flexibility
is desired for citizen-initiated measures. Citizens and advocates often have
little to no legal background or legislative expertise and a minor deficiency
should not be fatal to their efforts. However, should the court allow such
flexibility and grace to a powerful body like a state legislature ruled by a
supermajority?
In Florida, the judicial review of ballot language is unique.145 Florida
courts do not serve as editors of proposed ballot language but rather
executioners.146 If language is found to be legally insufficient, the courts do
not correct them as they see fit; defective language results in the entire
measure being stricken from the ballot.147 Such an error is fatal. Critics
rightfully deride such judicial power to remove a decision for Florida
voters.148 Advocates and organizers have often invested immense amounts of
time and money into a citizen-led initiative or referendum only to have the
entire effort set aside by a panel of judges.149 However, a legislatively referred
constitutional amendment goes to the ballot by a simple majority vote of a
governing body.150
Missouri should take note of Florida’s extraordinary power of judicial
review. If a legislatively referred constitutional amendment is found to have
141. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.190 (2017).
142. See Pippens, 606 S.W.3d at 698–700.
143. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.190
144. Thomas Rutherford, The People Drunk or the People Sober? Direct
Democracy Meets the Supreme Court of Florida, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 61, 171
(2002).
145. Id. at 170.
146. Id. at 171
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Jack Suntrup, Missouri abortion rights supporters sue secretary of state
after failed initiative petition, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 23, 2019),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/missouri-abortion-rightssupporters-sue-secretary-of-state-after-failed-initiative-petition/article_3393b638f0ab-5226-83f9-10792520e368.html [https://perma.cc/D9RX-LWM4].
150. MO. CONST., art. XII § 2(a).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss2/15

18

Johanson: Indirect Initiative and Unpopular Referendum in Missouri

2021]

INDIRECT INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

643

insufficient and unfair ballot language, such a defect should be fatal and not
simply grounds for correction. The entire measure should be forbidden from
appearing on the ballot until the legislature itself can create language that
meets legal standards in its next session. Otherwise, in their review, courts
essentially provide step-by-step instructions for the drafters to rewrite their
proposal to abide by state law while still accomplishing their self-serving
objectives.
This leads to the question, why should the drafting of language remain
within the domain of the legislature or a partisan official? The substantive
dispute in Pippens is primarily about who should be in charge of redistricting
and apportionment of legislative districts.151 The 2018 measure put the
process in nonpartisan hands.152 Ballot summaries and language of initiative
and referendums, whether proposed by citizens or the legislature, should be
placed in similarly non-partisan hands. Ballot language, often a few hundred
words, can determine if a measure succeeds or fails.153 Legislatures and
partisan Secretary of States often face a conflict of interests when drafting a
statement required to be “sufficient and fair” for the proposal they hope to
pass.154 Which raises an important question of why let citizens or elected
officials draft a ballot summary or initiative at all?
Many states with initiative and petition offer assistance to proponents on
the drafting of the relevant summary statement and ballot language. This
could be accomplished with two types of assistance: technical review and
substantive review.155 Technical review is exercised to ensure the proposal
meets legal requirements for formal and style and adheres to drafting
conventions.156 However, in states like Colorado, that review goes a step
further to ensure the quality, consistency, and fairness of initiative proposals
and their summary statements.157
In Colorado, the Legislative Council staff and Legislative Legal Services
hold public hearings on proposed initiatives to present their review and
comments.158 These hearings help proponents clarify their proposal, but they
are not required to accept any suggestions offered by legislative staff.159 The
meeting, held in the Capitol, is open to the public and although people who
151. Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689, 695–96 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).
152. Id. at 696.
153. See Grayson Keith Sieg, A Citizen's Guide to Redistricting Reform Through
Referendum, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 901, 938 (2015); William A. Lund, What's in A
Name? The Battle over Ballot Titles in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 143, 153–54
(1998).
154. Lack of legislative expertise can apply to members of the state legislature
and citizens and advocates can also have conflicting interests.
155. Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative:
Procedures That Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 79 (1995).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 81–82.
158. Id. at 81.
159. Id. at 81–82.
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may oppose a measure are welcome to attend, no testimony or comments are
accepted from anyone other than the proponents.160 The meeting is taped and
becomes public record.161 Proponents are required to go through this process
before they can move on to the next step of setting a title.162
Colorado also has a special Ballot Title Board that drafts the language
and summary statements that eventually go to voters.163 The Board is not
quite nonpartisan; it consists of the elected Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, and the director of the office of legislative services.164 Within two
weeks of a submitted initiative, the board must draft a title for the initiative, a
submission clause, and a clear, concise summary, all approved by a majority
vote of the board.165 The Colorado Constitution further requires the state to
mail a “ballot information booklet” to every registered voter before the
election and also requires the state to publish the proposed provisions in
newspaper notices.166 These requirements would help to ensure the electorate
rightfully understands the measures it has been asked to adopt.
Whether Missouri works to make defects in ballot language fatal, like
Florida, or hopes to institute an independent body to draft initiatives, like
Colorado, the General Assembly should explore ways to improve the flaws in
the state’s review of ballot language. The current process is not working.
Proponents of a measure are allowed to draft its appearance to voters.167
Courts only have the power to modestly edit language that is fundamentally
designed to deceive. Such a combination results in a power imbalance that
threatens popular majority rule.

VI. CONCLUSION
Pippens v. Ashcroft is the result of an escalating conflict between a
legislature’s will and the citizen’s want.168 Without needed protections and
reform, the initiative and referenda processes of Missouri are at risk of abuse
by a legislature who has failed to show restraint. Citizens continue to use their

160. Id. at 79, 93–94.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 79.
163. Id. at 93–94.
164. Id. at 94.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 99.
167. See MO. CONST. art. III, see also Gladys Bautista, Understanding the
ballot: What to know about Missouri Amendment 3, KRCG (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://krcgtv.com/news/local/understanding-your-ballot-what-to-know-aboutmissouri-amendment-3 [https://perma.cc/EF2A-CFWB].
168. 606 S.W.3d 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).
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rightful power to direct initiative and popular referendum. As demonstrated
in 2020, the supermajority in Jefferson City is happy to exercise indirect
initiative and unpopular referendum in response.169 The legislature, with a
slap on the wrist from the Court of Appeals, successfully repealed – with a
bare majority – a measure enacted by nearly two-thirds of Missouri voters. It
is the latest example in a growing trend of contempt held by elected officials
against the initiative process and their own constituency. Missourians were
hoodwinked and confused by language written for that purpose. This time,
popular reforms were replaced by a less-popular return to status-quo. The
result is an unfortunate result for any proponents of direct democracy. Still
larger threats of regression loom and the flaws in Missouri’s democratic
system must be addressed.

169. See Gabriella Limón & Yurij Rudensky, Missouri Amendment 3 Passed,
What Does that Mean for Redistricting?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/missouri-amendment-3passed-what-does-mean-redistricting [https://perma.cc/PW5C-TNYD].
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